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Venezuela in the Times of Chavez: A Study on Media, Charisma, and Social Polarization 
Mankind in general judge more by their eyes 
than their hands; for all can see the appearance, 
but few can touch the reality. Everyone sees 




1. Introduction: Media War and Social Polarization 
When one arrives in Caracas and listens to the radio or turns on the TV or browses through the 
newspapers, one is immediately struck by the black-or-white presentations of Venezuelan reality: 
either continuous attacks launched against President Hugo Chavez and his supporters by private 
media outlets, or almost unquestioned support by the public media and a number of supportive 
private media outlets. Soon I discovered, when traveling around the country and meeting people 
from different professions and walks of life, that socio-political polarization permeates not only 
the media but all of Venezuelan society. 
Venezuela's traditional ruling elite has relied extensively on the private media to orchestrate its 
efforts to overthrow Chavez. Virtually all of Venezuela's homes have at least one TV set, and yet 
the tone of private media discourse is notably reflective of the expensive tastes of rich, white, and 
fashionable Venezuelans. In fact, one has to turn on state television programs (the VTV program 
Barrio Adentro comes to mind here) to catch a glimpse of the actual cultural and racial diversity 
of Venezuelan society. Prior to the advent of Chavez, it was rare even in government TV to see 
an Afro-Venezuelan, even though they comprise a significant secotr of the population. 
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Such an elitist worldview can be seen especially in the various telenovelas (soap operas), reality 
programs, and commercials that appear in the main private television stations -- Venevision, 
RCTV, Globovision, Televen, and CMT -- which control close to 90 percent of the market. The 
news programs in these TV stations, as well as in the private radio networks, and 9 out of the l 0 
major national newspapers -- including El Naciona/, El Universal, Tai Cua/, El Impulso, El 
Nuevo Pais, and El Mundo - highlight the viewpoints and personalities of the traditional elite 
sidelined by the Chavez government, and ceaselessly derogate the government's policies, 
focusing on looming economic recessions, corruption, and crime. 1 
In contrast to the elitism found in the private media, a growing number of media outlets cater to 
Chavez's own project of "left populism," a vaguely-defined term referring to political power 
gained and sustained by appealing to the poor and common folk, and by opposing the elites that 
historically have run the country. The most important of these are the public-television channels, 
particularly VTV (Channel 8) but also Vive, Asamblea Nacional TV, Avila, and Telesur; also 
supportive of Chavez is the national public radio network, the official Bolivarian News Agency, 
as well as such pro-Chavez newspapers as Ultimas Noticias, Quinto Dia, and Vea. And while 
these outlets are numerically fewer than the private ones, they are rapidly growing in number and 
have a large and loyal following, especially within the nation's lower economic strata, a sector 
that comprises more than 60 percent of the population. In today's Venezuela it is commonplace to 
see, hear, and read angry denunciations of the cogol/os (corrupt traditional elites), with 
antagonists to Chavez being labeled "/os escualidos" (the squalid ones), former Chavez 
supporters traidores (traitors), and participants in strikes golpistas (coup-plotters). 
A precarious balance of the media voices of left and right was holding up to the December 2006 
presidential elections, which brought the 11th straight national electoral victory for the pro-
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Chavez forces . And yet, as early as the year 2001, members of those Chavista groups known as 
Circulos Bolivarianos have been staging noisy, threatening rallies outside of privately-owned 
newspapers and television stations or against specific anti-Chavez journalists. There has also been 
increasing governmental regulation and enforcement. In 2004 Venezuelans saw the enactment of 
a law requiring "social responsibility" in the media, while on May 2007, RCTV, the oldest TV 
station in the country, sent out its last transmission, its license being revoked with the justification 
that it had participated in subversive activities. It was replaced by the pro-Chavez station TVes. 
My main objective in this study is to deepen the reader's understanding of Venezuela ' s ongoing 
socio-political conflict by focusing on the struggle for control over one of the key agents of 
mobilization and politicization in the country: the media outlets, and particularly television. My 
methodology strives to interweave the chronological record of events with analysis of the equally 
relevant theoretical, institutional, political, economic, and cultural components that helped to 
create those events. Central to my presentation is its analysis of the decline of Venezuela's two 
traditional parties and the emergence of a charismatic and populist form of leadership. 
A key element of my methodology can be found in the seventeen interviews I conducted with 
renowned media experts, journalists, scholars, politicians, and individuals in other professions --
hailing from a wide range of political positions -- during the three research trips I took to 
Venezuela in 2004, 2005, and 2006. I rely on them frequently in order to offer the reader a 
balanced understanding of the sometimes widely different interpretations of specific events, 
personalities, and other relevant components found in my study. In addition, I learned a great deal 
about media and social polarization in the country through informal meetings with high officials 
and journalists at Venezolana de Television (VTV) and the Ministry of Communication and 
Information (MINCI) during my first trip in 2004, and through my participation, in 2006, in the 
monthly meeting of the Editorial Board of the Gumilla group, a think tank devoted to media and 
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communicational issues that publishes the prestigious journal Comunicaci6n . My methodology 
also includes participant observations, image and discourse analyses of television programs, 
textual analyses of print-media pieces, and my review of the relevant scholarly literature. 
2. Weak Parties, Strong Media 
Venezuela is a petro state, with the revenues it gamers from its state-owned oil industry serving 
as a lubricant that eases the frictions of rapid social change. Under the aegis of the 1958 pact 
known as Punta Fijo, the major political elites and the labor and business associations put aside 
their differences to enact a host of measures that have brought the country consistent economic 
growth, low inflation, a certain degree of social mobility and mass education, a professional class, 
and a subordinated military. It made possible the creation of a centralized state financed by 
steadily rising oil revenues, and the emergence of two strongly organized national parties. Acci6n 
.' lit 
\• Democnitica (AD) on the left and Comite de Organizaci6n Politica Electoral Independiente 
(COPED on the right, would go on to monopolize political action and control Venezuela's social 
movements the next three decades or so. Toward the end of that time-span, however, a series of 
traumatic events brought Venezuela from stability to crisis. 
On February 18, 1983 (known as Black Friday), the currency collapsed, initiating a period of 
depreciation and stagflation that continues to afflict Venezuela today. Six years later came the 
bloody urban riots of February 1989 known as El Caracazo, those having been the public ' s angry 
and spontaneous response to the new government's structural-adjustment package, which entailed 
price hikes and product shortages. 1992 brought not one but two attempted military coups: that of 
February 41h, which had Chavez as one of its leaders, and another on November 27111 • Further 
shocks were inflicted via the impeachment and removal from office of President Carlos Andres 
Perez and the subsequent election win, in December 1993, of former president Rafael Caldera. 
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Significantly, since it rang the death-knell of the old, relatively stable two-party system, in that 
election Caldera abandoned the party he himself had founded (COPEi) and instead ran an 
explicitly anti-party campaign. Each of these events, as Crisp and Levine have pointed out, 
"undermined or removed a key pillar of the old order: economic growth (Black Friday); social 
pacts and civil order (El Caracazo); a depoliticized and well-controlled military (the 1992 coups); 
and unquestioned executive dominance and party hegemony (the impeachment of Perez, and 
Caldera's anti-party campaign)" (Crisp and Levine 1998:29). 
There has been no lack of studies speculating as to the likely causes of the decline of Venezuela 's 
traditional parties. Coppedge (1994) believes that the two major parties' excessive penetration of 
civil society, right through the 1980s, suffocated citizens and excluded new entrants; Kornblith 
( 1998) thinks that the late-eighties fall off in oil revenues undermined the ability of the two 
parties to broker privileges to large sectors of the population; Corrales (2000) blames the parties 
for their lack of internal democracy, which shut down potential leaders and debarred ideological 
renewal, and also points to the repeated failure of the party in power to carry through any cogent 
package of economic reforms, with that ultimately causing Venezuelans to grow weary of 
unfulfilled promises; Lalander (2006) believes that the decentralization process already in place 
before the rise of Chavismo, with direct elections of mayors and governors, undermined the 
previous two-party hegemony. Other researchers (e.g. Levine and Crisp, 1998 and Ellner, 1995) 
have come up with their own combinations of the above factors . 
I would add two more factors to the list. First, in the 1970s and 1980s the homogenizing tendency 
of globalization, whether actual or perceived, served to defuse most ideological confrontation. 
For whereas in the 1950s and 1960s AD attracted chiefly the country's working and lower 
classes, while COPEi the nation 's emerging middle class and members of its economic elite, in 
the 1970s both parties began to gravitate toward the political center. Political loyalties based on 
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class identity waned, and the two parties devolved into mere "machines for extracting rents from 
the public arena" (Karl 1997:93) and distributing them as political patronage. Venezuela became 
a depoliticized democracy, in which administration replaced politics and government. It was at 
this juncture that the seeds were sown for a widespread feeling that the public realm needed to be 
repoliticized. The reality on the ground became that of an electorate contemptuous of traditional 
party platforms and determined to cast its vote on the basis of a candidate's proven performance 
and personality. While political parties still exist today, they have fragile internal structures that 
depend highly on personalities. In fact, since the 1998 election of Chavez Venezuela's "traditional 
two-party system has been replaced by a loose system composed of Chavez supporters, or 
Chavistas, and anti-Chavez activists" (Sainz Borgo and Paz 2005: 91). 2 
Second, as the old parties' traditional social bases of support were eroded away, politicians 
looked more upon the media as representing the central arena of political communication with the 
citizenry. As Panebianco .( 1988) has pointed out, the transformation of political communication 
has caused an earthquake within parties, as media coverage empowers the parties' elected 
representatives, along with their media advisors, while undercutting former bases of power 
enjoyed by party members and bureaucrats. Members of AD and COPEi adapted their activities 
to the logic of the media - a shift to a more image-oriented political life that underlines the 
personalization of the political sphere and the emergence of "political celebrities" - and in the 
process they lost their central place as organizers of the country's political life. This media logic 
usually places the sphere of government and politics on "safe" ideological grounds, discouraging 
politicians from speaking painful or complex truths. This was increasingly the case with the 
traditional Punta Fijo leadership in Venezuela, which became representatives of what Ranney 
( 1983: l 03) calls "nice guy politics," a form of bland populism where presentation and style are 
more important than ideology, policy, and principles. 
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The emergence of the Venezuelan private media as a political force was aided, according to 
Tucker, by "the concentration of media ownership and lax government regulation." This failure to 
enforce codified regulations "established the early expectation among commercial broadcasters 
for a laissez-faire relationship between government and private media" (Tucker 2004:8). From 
being subordinated to the political/military elites during the dictatorship years (until 1958), after 
democracy took hold in Venezuela in the 1960s, and a modern capitalistic and commercial 
mindset became prevalent in the political sphere, such large electronic media corporations as the 
Cisneros group and the Bottom & Granier group, as well as such print-media groups as Capriles, 
Otero-Calvo, and Mata-Nunez, grew exponentially both in economic and audience power, and in 
that process gained increasing independence from the government and the two hegemonic parties. 
In fact, as scholar and media expert Marcelino Bisbal pointed out in an interview for this study, 
"while the political parties, directly subsidized by the state, spend massively on advertising, the 
Venezuelan private media actually helped to foster in the public's mind the image of a wealthy 
country being mismanaged by corrupt or ill-prepared politicians, which proved to be a key 
element in eroding the influence of the traditional parties" (Bisbal 2006). 
Still, Bisbal, along with Lugo and Romero, considers that a relation of "symbiotic dependence" 
had existed for decades - up until Chavez arrived to the presidency and followed his own media 
agenda -- between media corporations and government in Venezuela. It was an undeclared pact 
based on a relationship "characterized by the duality between the influence that the media, 
especially television, has on Venezuela's public opinion against the hidden and tangible controls 
that the government has politically, legally, and logistically over the media" (Lugo and Romero 
2003: 11 ). In other words, the media-government relationship took place in the midst of a complex 
system of socio-economic and political interests based on balances and counter-balances of power 
that maintained a high degree of socio-political stability through their engaging each other in 
continuous dialogue and negotiation. 
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3. Chavez and the Media: A Marriage Made in Heaven and Hell 
It is ironic that the media's critical portrayals of traditional politicians and political parties have 
not only strengthened anti-elite sentiments within the population, but have brought populist actors 
-- and Chavez above all -- not just a receptive audience but a highly receptive medium over the 
years. Most Venezuelans got their first glimpse of Hugo Chavez during the waning hours of the 
attempted military coup of February 1992. Chavez was allowed to appear for 72 seconds before 
the television cameras to tell his troops to lay down their arms: 
Impeccably dressed in uniform, showing no sign of fatigue or stress, Chavez delivered a 
short speech, first emphasizing his Bolivarian values, then stating: "Unfortunately, for 
now the objectives we sought were not achieved in the capital city. That is, we in Caracas 
could not take control of power. You, there in the interior, did a great job. But it is time 
now to avoid further bloodshed; it is time to reflect. We will have new situations. The 
country definitely has to embark on the road to a better destiny" (Nairn 1993: 101-102). 
That brief exposure to Chavez, which also made visible the nation's crisis of legitimacy, was all it 
took to put this newcomer at the center of the political map. For here was a compelling and 
uncommon sight for television viewers: a new face that manage to maintain its composure even at 
the moment of defeat, and a firm voice that made no attempt to evade the repercussions of his 
actions. Thus, short as it was, the first genuinely "mediated" encounter between Chavez and the 
Venezuelan people was so resonant that even six years later, when Chavez ran for president, it 
assured him a basic substratum of national recognition and tentative popularity. The growing 
media attention during his 1998 campaign allowed Chavez to effectively denounce party leaders, 




democratic content, even as he extolled the people as naturally gifted agents of change and 
reconstruction. His campaign style was intensely personal and direct, emphasizing his association 
with the 1992 coup by sporting the red beret from his military uniform, which became the symbol 
of both his leadership quality and his commitment to change. 
After so many years in which the Venezuelan media had purveyed a strictly bland and upper-
class sort of populism, one can understand how so many Venezuelans could have found 
themselves attracted by Chavez's media image that projected a rogue, unconventional, yet strong 
leader interested in the problems of the common people. As journalist Ernesto Villegas pointed 
out in an interview for this study, "Chavez's media image was the antithesis of the traditional 
leadership that had come out of the Punta Fijo pact, and his charismatic powers quickly unified a 
previously fragmented left, attracting even those voters that were not convinced socialists, and 
utilizing for his personal gain the media's appetite for the unconventional" (Villegas 2006). The 
media facilitated the promotion of individual over organizational forms by labeling his ideas 
Chavismo and his supporters Chavistas. 3 No other candidate in the 1998 presidential race was 
afforded this level of personal elevation. On the other hand, as Lugo and Romero point out, it is a 
myth that Chavez won the elections with no elite support and against the frontal opposition of all 
the mainstream media corporations. Once he became a credible candidate, "El Naciona/, 
Venevisi6n, and partially Televen offered him his support, which became a crucial element for 
his electoral success" (Lugo and Romero 2003:4). Chavez did have a party, the Movimiento 
Quinta Republica or MVR (see endnote 2), but it was highly dependant on his mass appeal, and a 
personality cult emerged based mostly on Chavez's high media profile. 
Chavez's electoral triumph at the end of 1998 gave his coalition complete control of the 
legislature, and with the poor showing (some would say demise) of AD and COPEi at the polls, 
the private media was seen by the Venezuelan middle and professional classes, 4 who feared a 
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decline in their standard of living under Chavez, as the only credible institution left in the country 
capable of bringing together under one tent the wildly disparate opposition to Chavez, which 
ranges from former guerrillas to social democrats to ultra-rightists. Venezuela's private media 
corporations -- which dominate the media landscape of the country from production to 
distribution across virtually all media forms and technologies -- are owned by a few families who 
have a serious financial stake in wanting to see Chavez fall, especially after the undeclared pact, 
the historical dialogue between media and government, suddenly ended and was replaced with 
permanent confrontation. Further, according to Venezuelan journalists interviewed for this study, 
in Venezuela journalism has gradually fallen into the hands of businesspeople and managers who 
have only a layperson's exposure to its critical watchdog functions and its protection of freedom 
of expression. Thus, the private media leadership's immediate reaction was to defend their 
economic interests and orchestrate a permanent anti-Chavez media campaign that quickly moved 
from open confrontation to subversion. 
The constant glare of critical media publicity -- what Villegas calls "media overexposure" 
(Villegas 2006)-- against Chavez, in addition to an economic downturn in the three years 
immediately following his election, did have a negative effect, and Chavez's popularity declined. 
To counter this trend, Chavez regulated the private media through the various legal and political 
mechanisms he had available at hand. His initial strategy was based on implementing cadenas. 
The term literally means "chains" or "networks," but in fact it referred to Chavez's long and often 
rambling public addresses to the nation, which he obliged all of the television and radio networks 
to broadcast. With each passing year the cadenas grew both in length and number - there were 
"13 of them just in January 2003" (Hawkins 2003: 1156), during a general strike. Then in 2004 his 
government enacted a new law, popularly known as Ley Resorte, to be regulated by a commission 
(CONATEL) appointed by the president. This law makes virtually all daylight programming 
(from 6 a.m. to 8 p.m.) as "protected time" for children, which means that no program having any 
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objectionable content, be it sexual or violent or dangerous to health, may be broadcast. Under the 
cover of this "social responsibility" law the government can impose heavy fines and/or revoke 
broadcasting licenses even for such indefinable offenses as disseminating information deemed to 
run "contrary to national security." The law criminalizes the publication or broadcasting of any 
statement that shows a "lack of respect" for government authorities or that "insults" government 
leaders. It has been criticized by such advocates of press freedom as Reporters without Borders, 
The Committee to Protect Journalists, The International Federation of Journalists, Human Rights 
Watch, Amnesty International, and The Inter-American Human Rights Commission, the last of 
these having expressed its concern that the law's "vague terminology" and "potentially excessive 
penalties" could intimidate journalists and media companies "into failing to report on matters of 
public interest" (The Economist 2005). 
Objectionable as it may be, Chavez's media strategy came in response to real threats he perceived 
in the endless attacks by the private media in the three years stretching from his inauguration in 
January 1999 to the (in)famous event known as "the media coup" of April 2002.5 The private 
media elaborated "narratives that gave meaning to the events on the streets, constructing a social 
imagery that sought to legitimize certain subjects and disqualify others" (Gottberg 2004: 118), and 
served as a 2417 forum where all opposition figures could call upon the populace to join them in 
anti-Chavez demonstrations. My analysis of press photographs and TV images supports 
Gottberg's finding that the Chavista crowds were routinely presented in darkly negative images, 
as a mob or rabble, whereas the largely light-skinned marchers representing "civil society" were 
depicted in such heroic poses as that of a long row of women moving decisively forward, bearing 
a giant Venezuelan flag. 
In the days leading up to the media coup, those four private TV stations that Chavez has dubbed 
"the four horsemen of the apocalypse" -- Venevision, RCTV, Globovision, and Televen --
11 
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preempted regular programming in order to air relentlessly anti-Chavez speeches, with these 
being interrupted only for "public service announcements" (actually sponsored by the oil 
industry, another key player in the conflict) calling on viewers to immediately take to the streets: 
"Not one step backward! Out! Leave now!" In the course of my interviewing I was struck by how 
strong the consensus was, right across the politically diverse range of my interviewees, that 
during the confusing coup period of April 10-14, 2002, the private media acted in a way strongly 
suggesting that it was a key accomplice in the plot to overthrow Chavez, and that they had 
stepped outside the law. This view has been effectively disseminated through various media 
formats, with the most famous being the documentary "The Revolution Will Not Be Televised" 
by Irish directors Kim Bartley and Donnacha O'Brian, which was shot inside the Presidential 
Palace the day of the coup. 
In the two days following the coup (April 12 and 13), the media decided not to present the 
adverse reaction of the popular sectors to the overthrow of Chavez, who was taken by the military 
from the presidential palace to an island prison. The headline in the front page of El Universal the 
day after the coup was "A Step in the Right Direction," and the main governmental television 
station, VTV Channel 8, had been taken off the air. But the Chavista demonstrations being held 
in those days in front of the headquarters of major private media outlets, demanding that they 
inform their audiences about what was truly going on in the country, made it clear how well "the 
mob" understood that mediation through television guaranteed their own socio-political 
existence. And yet their ensuing mobilization to demand that Chavez be returned to power led to 
the imposition of a news blackout, with every Venezuelan station continuing with normal 
programming, which meant mostly soap operas and light entertainment. There was a reprisal 
factor at work there, for previously the privately owned networks had protested against Chavez's 
policy of decreeing cadenas. Now the private networks had instituted their own cadena. 
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Chavez was back in power only three days after the coup, and a short media cease-fire followed. 
This meant, according to media expert Andres Canizales in an interview for this study, "both that 
Chavez recognized the power of the media to destabilize his government and that the media 
recognized the popular support of the President among wide sectors of the population. But there 
was little room for compromise, and both camps quickly restarted the media war, with the private 
outlets calling for a general strike at the end of 2002, and then calling for a referendum on Chavez 
staying on as president in 2004." Chavez went right back to his cadenas, while also using his 
weekly call-in show, A/6 Presidente, to denounce specific news articles, programs, and even 
journalists. Little wonder then that "Venezuelans became more suspicious when approaching the 
media" (Canizales 2005), given all of Chavez's accusations thundering out of the left, and the 
rightist private media's incessant proselytizing, between 2002 and 2004, for the holding of a 
popular referendum, one that, ironically enough, had been made possible by the new Bolivarian 
Constitution instituted by Chavez himself shortly after his electoral victory of 1998. 6 
The referendum was held on August 2004 and Chavez won it with close to 60 percent of the vote. 
After this Chavez victory, like every other, the private media owners felt the need (or the 
pressure) to fire their most outspoken anti-Chavez journalists. Such "victims" of the ongoing 
media war, 7 of whom there have been many, loom almost as large as martyrs in anti-Chavista's 
eyes, given the way the media, in an ever-more-polarized Venezuela, has taken on a central 
leadership role within the opposition. Media giant The Cisneros Group, owner of Venevision, as 
well as Televen, owned by The Camero Group, arrived at a modus vivendi with the Chavez 
government a few months after the referendum, one that entailed their dramatically toning down 
their attacks on the government. CMT was bought by the pro-Chavez international news network 
Telesur on December 2006. And Chavez's banishment of RCTV -- the oldest television station in 
the country and one of the president's fiercest critics -- from the airwaves in May 2007 (it 
resumed broadcasting in cable and satellite on July 16, 2007), has left Venezuela with just 
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Globovision, an all-news channel whose signal extends no further than the capital city of Caracas, 
as the single television outlet critical of Chavez. 
Thus, what the former Minister of Communication and the present President of Telesur, Andres 
Yzarra, has dubbed a "Chavista media hegemony"(Cafiizalez 2007) is becoming a reality in 
Venezuela. This hegemony is based, according to Bisbal, on "repressive tolerance" (Bisbal 2006), 
a sort of "selective enforcement" approach based on the legal framework that the government 
now has in place, which allows it to repress the private media in specific cases (for example 
RCTV), even though most of the time it assumes a position of tolerance. 
4. Chavez's Media-Fueled, Charismatic Leadership Style 
Max Weber has famously distinguished three types of authority: traditional, legal, and 
( / 
' charismatic. Liberal democracies overcame the old feudal, inherited forms of authority, and 
adopted legal authority, which is meant to be based on meritocracy. Gone are the days, however, 
when politicians and ministers were given at least an initial benefit of the doubt, out of respect for 
their presumed competence. Arguably that mediatization of political life which we have been 
looking at here has undermined the citizen's perception of the elite's competence and pushed the 
door wide open to the third type of authority, charisma, of which Weber wrote: 
The charismatic structure knows nothing of a form or of an ordered procedure of 
appointment or dismissal. . . Charisma knows only inner determination and inner 
restraint. The holder of charisma seizes the task that is adequate for him and demands 
obedience and a following by virtue of his mission. His success determines whether he 
finds them. His charismatic claim breaks down if his mission is not recognized by those 




he knows how to maintain recognition through "proving" himself. But he does not derive 
his "right" from their will, in the manner of an election. Rather the reverse holds: it is the 
duty of those to whom he addresses his mission to recognize him as their charismatically 
qualified leader. [Weber 1958:246-7]. 
Chavez's charismatic leadership-style has proven over time to respond closely to those 
parameters laid down by Weber. While he publicly recognizes the Bolivarian Constitution as the 
only legitimate source of governmental power, the real pillars of his administration have been his 
personality and mission. As Roberts (2003:53) puts it, "Chavez quickly replaced party-based 
mediation between state and society" with a media-based, "direct, personalistic relationship 
between the masses and a charismatic, though highly divisive, caudillo, who claims to represent 
'the people' while his opponents represent a minority group of outsiders or 'others."' 
The comments made to me by the pro-Chavez interviewees underline the charismatic nature of 
his leadership. As they see it, his is the voice of the rebellion of that "silent majority" that wants 
its politicians to know, as opposed to merely listen to, the people, and to implement policies that 
are in line with their wishes. They believe that Venezuelan voters support Chavez because they 
see in him extraordinary leadership qualities, and exchange votes for the promise of radical social 
change. 
While charismatic leadership is not the same as populist leadership, there are important 
similarities, one of them being the weberian notion of charismatic linkage, where leader and 
people are one, a notion that we see emerging in the comments above. What differentiates the 
populist leader is that s/he stands in stark contrast to elitism, and stresses, in additiOn to her/his 
charismatic powers, a political discourse that relies on the idea of a popular will reminiscent of 
Rousseau's conception of the term. 
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In any case, Chavez has cultivated the charismatic linkage by creating the Misiones (Missions), a 
bureaucracy that runs parallel to the traditional channels of representation and political mediation, 
and which has become the heart of Chavismo. The Misiones provide the masses with free 
education and health care, subsidized food, social services, land reform, and environmental 
protection, and have brought Chavez a direct payoff in the form of support and high participation 
levels among Venezuela's lower-income sectors. And yet the Misiones --created by Chavez with 
the justification that governors, mayors, ministers, and bureaucrats have been too slow to meet 
the people's needs -- answers to no one except the President, and its lack of transparency has 
sparked allegations of corruption and patronage that have haunted his administration until today. 
And while Chavez's institution of the Misiones is in keeping with Weber's dictum that "the 
holder of charisma seizes the task that is adequate for him, and demands obedience and a 
following by virtue of his mission," we of the twenty-first century know at least one thing about 
charisma that early-twentieth-century Weber very likely did not: It is a gift of the media as of the 
gods. The media outlets have been central to the development of Chavez's sociopolitical 
worldview, for he understood very well from the very beginning of his career that he needs 
continuous access to them in order to show the people his extraordinary character and 
indoctrinate them in order to create the potential for mass mobilization. Little wonder, then, that 
Chavez has brought so many media people into his inner circle of advisors,8 and that he gives so 
much importance to the maintenance of his image as a man both personable and approachable. 
We can say that Chavez and the mass media were made for each other, but their marriage was 
made both in heaven and hell. The problem that Chavez has encountered is that the beloved 
medium, the one he depends on, keeps on rebelling against him. The conflict between Chavez and 
the private media outlets has been over the interpretation of not only national and international 
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reality, but of the future of the nation. His efforts at the all-important task of image-making --
which really means the promotion of a personality cult -- have been continuously sabotaged by 
the private media through their reinterpretation of the positive media images that Chavez designs 
for public consumption to fit into such negative stereotypes as the leader of the mob, or the 
authoritarian caudillo who is working with Fidel Castro to tum Venezuela into a totalitarian state. 
In the absence of the traditional consensus between the government and private media outlets in 
Venezuela, and very little interest in negotiation in either camp (especially during Chavez's first 
five years in power), the confrontational relations between these two actors expanded 
exponentially. The increasing subversive nature of the private media outlets clashed with an 
increasingly authoritarian administration, with the result being wider social polarization. Chavez 
decisively pushed for greater media access through various methods. I have mentioned cadenas. 
Another has been favoring with official propaganda {TV, radio and newspaper ads) those media 
outlets with editorial content favorable to the government (UCAB/Cafiizalez Study 2006). This 
move consolidated even further the traditional ties of the private media with such opposition 
business organizations as FEDECAMARAS, FEDENAGA, CONSECOMERCIO, and 
CONINDUSTRIA, which are the main consumers of media ads outside the government. 
Moreover, once Chavez had a brief breathing space after the failed media coup and the 60-day 
general strike of December 2002 and January 2003, he advanced a prominent media project, 
Telesur, a South American news network designed to undercut the international dominance of 
CNN Espanol and BBC Mundo, and to serve as an international outlet sympathetic to his vision 
and personality. A new Ministry of Communication was created in 2003 to replace what had been 
the Ministry of Information. The logic behind this move was that the latter institution had merely 
disseminated government propaganda, whereas the new Ministry, responsible for 
communicational strategy and setting up international media links, would also encourage a 
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grassroots revolution in media control and production leading to what has been called 
"community media." 9 He has turned the screws on the private media outlets through a long series 
of regulating measures that included the Ley Resorte, the Right to Retort (Derecho de Replica) 
(2001), the ratification of the Norms of Disobedience (2003), and the obligation to belong to a 
professional organization to practice journalism (2004). In addition to penalties and legal 
obstacles there has been intimidation of both journalists and media organizations in the 
opposition, with the culmination of the government's refusal to renew the license of RCTV. And 
last but definitely not least, he has effectively utilized his weekly program A/6 Presidente to 
enhance his charismatic image and his mission, and at the same time weaken the opposition . 
5. The Chat-Show Presidency 
Every Sunday morning for several hours Venezuelans can tune in almost any television or radio 
station (they are in cadena) to watch or hear their beloved -- or despised, as the case may be -
leader in action. He seems to be merely playing the role of the friend and teacher who reveals 
what everyone wants to know, while chatting with members of the public live on air, but in fact 
he is channeling lower-class anger against the upper and middle classes by reinforcing the animus 
felt by "us" against "them" by invoking the Bible, the writings of Simon Bolivar, and popular 
sayings and songs. He deftly interweaves into his discourse such pragmatic elements as the 
distribution of low-cost housing, subsidized food products, new jobs, scholarships, and other 
tangible assets. Indeed, in a similar fashion as the Misiones have come to substitute many 
functions of the official social-welfare branches of the federal government, so too this chat-show 
presided by Chavez himself has taken over functions that in theory belong to the Ministry of 
Communications and other agencies of the federal government. 
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Chavez' s televisual confrontation every Sunday in A/6 Presidente with the Venezuelan "corrupt" 
elites and/or "American imperialism" and/or "capitalist globalization" has become in the eyes of 
his followers a sort of epic, justifying even his debasing of such democratic practices as 
pluralism, which rejects the Manichean worldview of both populism and elitism, and instead 
"looks at society as a heterogeneous collection of groups and individuals with often 
fundamentally different views and goals." While elitism highlights the extraordinary abilities and 
wisdom of members of a particular social group, populism, though a distinct ideology, is, 
according to Mudde (2004:544), "a thin-centered ideology" in the sense that it does not possess 
"the same level of intellectual refinement and consistency as for example socialism and 
liberalism." Populism has a moralistic rather than programmatic core infused by the normative 
distinction between the "elite" and "the people." This core can be combined with a wide range of 
political concepts and ideologies, as Chavez does in Alo Presidente, where he avoids delineating 
a clear political or economic platform, and instead he deftly uses colloquial language, joke-
telling, and mimicry to combine into one such different ideologies as nationalism, socialism, and 
ecologism, throwing different types of national development strategies and historical insights into 
the mix. 
In Alo Presidente, Chavez successfully adapted the chat-show format to his vision of creating a 
program to entertain, inform, proselytize, and mobilize the public. Its informal, conversationalist 
style allows Chavez to explore the logic of different political positions each week without the 
fear of major consequences, and change course if needed -- a strategy that some interviewees for 
this study call "ineffective and even dangerous,'' while others dubbed it Chavez's "pragmatist 
approach to politics." The program has evolved into a sort of forum that projects his ever-
changing vision of "Socialism of the 21 51 Century" and what it will bring to the nation. 
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A distinctive element of the program is the presence of "the people" in the form of a large 
audience. Their chorus-like commentary invariably sparks a set of reactions and responses that 
connects viewers and members of the audience with Chavez himself, and provide a unique 
method for evaluating the actions of the Bolivarian revolution. It allows the television viewer, for 
instance, to participate with Chavez and members of the audience in making inferences about the 
character and competence of elected representatives and/or the success or failure of particular 
social projects on the basis of common sense performance evaluations. 
Alo Presidente's wild blend of such ingredients as the sanctification of Simon Bolivar, the public 
criticism of Chavez's own party and members of his cabinet for moving too slowly on pressing 
issues, denouncing George Bush and other "imperialist" leaders for conspiring against the 
Bolivarian revolution, addressing the material needs of "his people," remembering with nostalgia 
his military past, along with other intellectually serious, bemusedly whimsical, and 
heartwarmingly sentimental elements, has made the program an integral part of Venezuelan 
popular culture. Some of the interviewees for this study considered that Alo Presidente is 
arguably just as powerful an opiate of the masses as those private media products: the telenovelas 
and reality shows that reflect and even glorify the values of consumerist capitalism. Still, as 
Tolson (1991: 178) observes, the chat-show has an ambivalence inscribed in it that the te/enove/as 
do not: it is designed "both to inform and entertain; to appear serious and sincere, but also playful 
and even flippant." These ambiguities, and the ironic reactions they evoke, can have negative 
political consequences - by making serious matters seem trivial - but it may also have positive 
democratic consequences, by informing the public of the government actions and projects 
regularly and promote mass participation. 
6. Today's Venezuela: The Long Bout Continues 
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Following upon the December 2006 electoral victory in which he garnered close to 63 percent of 
the vote, Chavez said that the previous eight years of his government had constituted merely a 
"phase of transition." Now, he insisted "we are entering a new era, the National Simon Bolivar 
Project of 2007-2021, which aims to construct 'Bolivarian socialism' or 'Socialism of the 21 51 
century."' In that same speech, Chavez set forth "five motors" that were sure to advance the 
revolution: ( 1) an "enabling law" that would allow him for the first 18 months of his new six-
year-term to pass laws by decree in order to implement changes rapidly; (2) a constituent 
assembly that will oversee constitutional reform and provide the legal framework for the planned 
changes; (3) Bolivarian education system, to instill socialist values; (4) changes in Venezuela 
geographical power-structure, designed to give more say to marginalized regions; and (5) a 
dismantling of the "bourgeois state" with it being replaced by an explosion "of communal 
councils." (Munckton, 2007) 
Chavez has been careful to deny that his envisioned new Venezuela will be communist in nature. 
In a speech broadcast given on December 3, 2006, he insisted that his brand of socialism is not 
really anything new, invented, or imported, but rather is "Indo-Venezuelan, homegrown, 
Christian, and Bolivarian." In a speech a month later, on January 8, 2007, Chavez was a bit more 
explicit: his government's aim is "social ownership over the strategic sectors of the means of 
production" (Riddell 2007) 
Given these rather vague explanations and the concrete policies the Chavez government has 
pursued in the past eight years, is Venezuela really heading towards something that could be 
called a socialist, communist, or at least post-capitalist order? It cannot be denied, on the one 
hand, that the government has expanded non-private forms of ownership via cooperative, social-
production enterprises (Empresas de Producci6n Social); public-private joint ventures, co-
management (greater worker participation in the administration of private enterprises), and the 
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expansion of companies either managed or owned by the state. Notable among the several new 
state-owned enterprises Chavez has created are those in the areas of telecommunications, air 
travel, and petrochemicals. Such state-redistribution mechanisms do of course go against the 
basic principles of capitalism, but given the broader context within which they are working -
most exchange in Venezuela still occurs in a free market context, the most important media 
outlets are still in private hands, the economy has been growing in the past two years (2005 and 
2006) at rates above 9 percent (Severo 2006), its private sector now accounts "for more of the 
economy, 62.5 percent of GDP, than when Chavez was elected in 1998, when it stood at 59.3 
percent" (Rendall 2007:4), and the Bolivarian trade-union movement is in disarray, wracked by 
factional divisions - the situation in Venezuela seems to fit better, at least at the present moment, 
within the social-democratic than the socialist camp. 
On the other hand, it is important to highlight that Chavez has kept his hold on power through his 
deft avoidance of what Weber calls the "routinization of charisma." Chavez has continually 
restocked his cabinet, has had a total of four vice-presidents, and has kept all political parties at 
bay by claiming that they merely create artificial divisions and put their interests above those of 
the people. Although two-thirds of the votes he garnered in December 2006 came to him under 
the aegis of his old party, the MVR (the rest were widely scattered) he explained shortly after his 
victory: "Let's not fall into lies. Those votes were not for any party ... They were votes for 
Chavez, for the people ... The revolution requires a united party, not an alphabet soup." He 
declared that the MVR's "work is completed, it must past into history," and that the United 
Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) will be his new party. It will differ from its forebears 
because it will "be built from the base by the popular committees that fought and won the 
election." Those moved by those words doubtless did not include the old hands at the MVR and 
other parties that have contributed in bringing Chavez this far, for the man whom they had 
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worked so tirelessly for now made it clear that "You will not see me with the same old faces, the 
same party leaderships - no, that would be a deception" (Riddell 2007). 
Many of this study's interviewees shared with me their belief that the Chavez years have created 
a new elite that has become rapidly "bourgeoisified," due to its recently-acquired wealth and 
political power, and that many of its members that are now being sidelined or shuffled to lesser 
positions in the government might join the opposition or work against new policies from within, 
simply because they consider that Chavez's revolution is now taking a direction that can affect 
negatively their own interests. That is, these interviewees believed that the undoing of the 
Bolivarian Revolution will come from within, that it will be deformed by the particular interests 
of the people whom Chavez has chosen to surround himself with. 
Be that as it may or may not be in the future, for the time being there can be no doubt that 
Chavez's strategy to maintain himself in power, based on redistributing wealth and reducing 
poverty, has completely transformed Venezuelan politics. His chief adversary in the last election, 
Manuel Rosales, a free-market advocate and governor of the state of Zulia, adopted many of 
Chavez's populist policies, in an attempt to cut into his base. He promised that every Venezuelan 
would receive a monthly stipend, funded by oil revenues, of at least 250 dollars per month, more 
than the current minimum wage. He also promised to pay students' tuitions even at the private 
universities and raise considerably the wages of civil servants, but the most effective prong of his 
attack pointed to the nation's high level of crime, undeniably a major problem. 
Opposition leaders are in disarray not only because of the failure of their actions, but even more 
because of the nature of their tactics. That Chavez has the opposition on the run is shown in their 
widespread defeatism, which tries to pass itself off as a principled policy of resistance. I'm 
thinking here of the opposition unwillingness to play the democratic game, as seen during the 
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April 2002 media coup, the December 2002 oil industry shutdown, and the December 2005 mid-
term elections boycott, which ended up packing the 167 seats of the National Assembly with 
Chavistas. Thus Chavez, who started as a fairly moderate politician back in 1998, has had plenty 
of political capital handed to him with each subsequent defeat of the opposition, capital he has 
used to become increasingly more radical. 
Good as things now must look to Chavez, however, four factors remain the most likely obstacles 
blocking the long-term realization of his dream of a Bolivarian and socialist Venezuela. First, 
there is the media-fueled, charismatic leadership style that has gotten Chavez this far, which has 
resulted in an extreme dependency on his figure, eschewing such key strategic aspects of nation-
building as the definition of a coherent political program and the consolidation of effective 
political organizations. Second, there is mounting evidence that new forms of patronage and 
discrimination are taking place, including officials in the government preventing anti-Chavistas 
from acquiring government jobs and certain services -- the most notorious case in this regard 
being that of the "Tasc6n List," which lists all Venezuelans who signed the 2004 petition asking 
for a recall referendum on Chavez. Such practices ultimately undercut efforts to create a society 
which embraces all people, regardless of their political outlooks. Third, there above-mentioned 
interests of the Chavista elites might slow or even derail the revolutionary process as it has been 
envisioned by Chavez. And fourth, Chavez's militaristic education has reinforced in him, and in 
those now running Venezuela, to adopt a top-down approach to problem solving that tends to 
make a mockery of Chavez's continual invocations of the opposite spirit, based on equality and 
participatory democracy, at the grass-roots-level of community building. 
Those interviewees sympathetic to Chavez expressed that problems of the type described above 
are "minor" in the sense of their being the sadly inevitable byproducts of an otherwise genuinely 
progressive regime. What cannot be denied, however, and what the interviews opened my own 
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eyes to, is the way that the national mood of "us" versus "them" has ended up infecting even 
Venezuela's leading intellectuals, scholars, and journalists who once had, and have now missed, 
their chance (from 2001 to 2004 just before the referendum, when the media war was still in a 
state that can be called a "standoff') to rise above the fray and chart a middle course. Time and 
again I heard my interviewees, on both sides of the political spectrum, agree that Venezuela is 
passing through an "extraordinary time" and that the fundamental principles of journalism can be 
violated because the time is ripe to be "militant and loyal" while assuming that impartiality and 
objectivity will be able to reassert themselves at some hypothetical later date. The widespread 
prevalence of such an attitude can only be cause for dismay. For although a time like the one 
Venezuela is now undergoing heightens everyone's sociopolitical consciousness, in fact what we 
are seeing is not the consolidation of a public sphere based on fair and equal dialogue, as 
Habennas ( 1991) would like it, but rather, as Luisa Azaje has put it, "a spiral of verbal violence" 
(Azaje 2002: 12) that is sucking both sides into its maelstrom. 
When one looks at the private-media side of this war, the first fact one comes upon is that those 
media have been able to bring together the disparate elements of the opposition, but unable to 
present coherent proposals or alternatives beyond demanding the removal of Chavez, either by 
resignation or by the holding of immediate elections. Such a strictly negative agenda can't help 
but lose steam over time. Further, the private media's aggressively anti-Chavez stance has 
produced a growing public perception that they lack both rationality and a culture of tolerance, 
and do so because they are defending strictly private interests. One might assert that the private 
media have taken on the role of a political party, one that is unnatural, given that they continually 
reveal themselves against precisely that distanced objectivity at the root of true journalism. 
And yet there are no simple solutions here, such as urging the private media outlets to forsake 
their scramble for center stage and instead go back to their role of mediators and bridge-builders. 
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For the fact is that again and again, in their long bout with Chavez, these companies have taken 
many solid hits and are now either fighting hard for their own survival - RCTV, now 
broadcasting through cable and satellite, and Globovision -- or have reached an agreement of 
coexistence with the government, as is the case with Venevision and Televen. Nor can anyone 
doubt that Chavez's obsession with media control, and his need for continuous coverage to fuel 
his ongoing cult of personality, have earned him more and more ground in the slow war of 
attrition he is waging against his media enemies. 
The case for Hugo Chavez would have to begin by noting that when he assumed the presidency in 
1999 he was well aware that the old social contract between people and government had lost 
whatever degree of substantiality it had once possessed - hence his desire to reconstruct it based 
upon his charisma as purveyed by televisual means. Over these past eight years that he has been 
in power, Chavez and his movement have instituted a progressive constitution and have 
redirected much of Venezuela's oil wealth toward social programs; the most important of the 
latter being the Misiones, Of course, whether any of that actually fulfills Chavez's self-imposed 
mandate of creating a socialistic alternative to neo-liberal economic development, and of working 
toward what he calls a "multi-polar world," must be left to every Venezuelan, and interested .. 
party, to decide. What is certain, according to all of my interviewees, is that Venezuela's public 
life remains riddled with clientelism, patronage, and corruption, and within this context the 
promulgation of Chavez's cult of personality has left space for few alternatives to be followed 
upon, even by those who a:re ready to support the generally progressive causes espoused by 
Chavez every Sunday morning on A/6 Presidente. 
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